This paper studies corporate governance when a¯rm faces imperfect competition. We derive¯rms' decisions from utility maximisation by individuals.
INTRODUCTION 1.Background
A central problem in corporate governance is to explain why¯rms are organised in the way they are. As Hansmann (1996) shows there are a wide range of¯rms in reality. These range from the small single owner/manager¯rm, through large corporations with separated shareholders, bondholders, boards and managers, to worker cooperatives, professional partnerships and hybrid organizations, which include nonpro¯ts such as hospitals, charitable organizations, schools and universities. From his discussion of the¯rm, he characterizes the myriad organizations that have evolved to deal with a wide range of organizational problems. In particular these arise where agents interact strategically in producing commodities or complex services. Factors such as the degree of competition in product and input markets and the presence of asymmetric information have a major in°uence on the nature of the¯rm. Hansmann (1996) cites a number of examples where¯rms are owned either by those who purchase their outputs or those who supply inputs to the¯rm. He argues that, in most cases, this is to counter monopoly or monopsony power. This practice is very common among¯rms, which supply inputs to or buy produce from farms.
(See also Refsell (1914) .) In relatively remote rural areas, it is easier to establish a local monopoly. Likewise lawyers and accountants usually organise as partnerships.
The reason for this is similar. The¯rm is a monopoly supplier of inputs which these people need to work. Partnerships reduce the monopoly distortion.
In the present paper we consider how imperfect competition interacts with the objective function of the¯rm. For example, consider the labour market where¯rms hire specialised labour that is industry-and/or¯rm-speci¯c. Our model allows ā rm to take into account the strategic e®ect of hiring the particular type of labour on the reaction of other¯rms in the industry. In particular our results imply that the non-pro¯t¯rm can pursue a more aggressive strategy in the labour market at the expense of pro¯t maximising¯rms. Similar considerations apply if there is imperfect competition in the product market.
Modelling Firm's Decisions
In this paper, we consider an economy with monopoly or oligopoly. As we shall argue, there is a strong case against assuming pro¯t maximisation when markets are distorted. However, it is not clear what the alternative should be. We model the¯rm as a collection of individuals, each of whom is maximising his/her utility. Decisions are made by a process of aggregating the preferences of a group of decision-makers within the¯rm.
1
One approach, which has been used in the past, is to model decisions as being made by a majority vote of shareholders, see for instance Geraats and Haller (1998) , Hart and Moore (1996) or Renstrom and Yalcin (1997) . However one can object to shareholder voting models by arguing that, in practice, management have more in°uence than shareholders. To model this, we assume that the¯rm's decisions are 1 Examples of such procedures would be the Nash bargaining solution used by Hart and Moore (1990) , non-cooperative bargaining, de DeMeza and Lockwood (1998), Bolton and Xu (1999) or the voting models used by De Marzo (1993), Kelsey and Milne (1996) and Sadanand and Williamson (1991) .
made by a group of individuals, which we shall refer to as the control group. For example, the control group could consist of the shareholders and senior management.
As another example, consider a¯rm with no shareholders, but is a partnership.
This case is common in legal, accounting,¯nance and professional¯rms, where thē rm produces services that are a function of human capital, individual and team e®ort. However, to preserve generality, we shall not explicitly describe the criteria for membership of the control group.
At present there is no widely accepted theory of the internal structure of the¯rm (for recent surveys of the governance literature see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Allen and Gale (2000) and Tirole (2001) ). For this reason we use an abstract model. We make, what we believe to be the mild assumption, that the¯rm's procedures respect unanimous preferences within the control group. Such rules would include, inter alia, those which give a major role for management. Note that many familiar forms of governance can be seen as special cases, for instance producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, including worker representatives on the board (as in Germany) and many types of non-pro¯t organisation. Despite the generality, our model is able to make a number of predictions concerning equilibrium behaviour and to throw some light on policy questions.
In a discussion of¯rm structures, Hansmann (1996) provides many examples of rms that are cooperatives, partnerships and non-corporate forms. Some are complex non-pro¯t forms, where the services provided appear to require subtle forms of organisation. Hence it is desirable that any model of the¯rm should be°exible in abstracting from details that are speci¯c to particular situations and should deal instead with the decision-making process in a general way.
Some theories of the¯rm use bargaining models to determine the relative power of di®erent individuals. By varying the bargaining game, it is possible to induce di®erent outcomes to the management-control mechanism or game. Although some of these games have some semblance to reality, we feel they are highly stylized. We prefer to abstract from the details of the bargaining process and simply assume that whatever the bargaining or management game, the process leads to an e±cient outcome. If one believes that in certain situations, that the outcome is ine±cient, then it would be important to explain the source of the ine±ciency. One could think of our model as the outcome of a process to design an e±cient mechanism. If this is infeasible then we are dealing with ine±cient mechanisms. As this is an open theoretical question, we simply by-pass it by assuming an e±cient mechanism exists and explore the consequences of that assumption. We brie°y discuss how our results would be a®ected by ine±cient mechanisms in the conclusion, (see also Tirole (1999) ).
Corporate Governance and Imperfect Competition
Consider a¯rm that is the sole producer of a particular good. Assume that there is consumer representation in the control group. We argue that the¯rm will produce a greater quantity and sell at a lower price than a conventional pro¯t maximising monopolist. A small price reduction will result in a second order loss of pro¯ts but ā rst order gain in their consumer surplus. We also investigate the e®ect of stakeholder representation on price and quantity decisions.
In oligopolistic industries there is a similar e®ect of the¯rm's governance on price.
In addition, the choice of the¯rm's constitution can a®ect the strategic interaction in markets. Consider a¯rm in a Cournot oligopoly. Starting at the pro¯t-maximising level, a decrease in price will lower pro¯ts but raise consumer surplus. Di®erent individuals will trade-o® these two e®ects in di®erent ways depending on their share-holdings and consumption patterns. Suppose a¯rm gives more weight in its decision procedures to those who have a relatively greater preference for low prices. Then, ceteris paribus, the¯rm will charge lower prices and produce more output. This will cause rivals to reduce their output thus possibly giving the¯rm a strategic advantage in the market. Hence increasing in°uence of consumers on decision-making will, up to a point, increase pro¯ts. 2
The above argument implies that there is an optimal form of corporate governance, which can be derived from considerations of the¯rm's position in input or product markets. Consider an entrepreneur who designs the constitution of the¯rm with a view to selling it to outside investors. Then there is an optimal constitution of the¯rm which will maximise its value. This will only be compatible with pro¯t maximisation in exceptional circumstances. We investigate how the optimal constitution varies with the number of¯rms. The deviation from pro¯t maximisation is greatest when the number of¯rms is small and tends to zero as it becomes very large.
Similar arguments can be used if the¯rm faces imperfectly competitive input markets. In this case it would be desirable to increase the power of those with a relatively high preference for raising the input price. In professions such as law, medicine and education, it is common for some or all suppliers of labour to have more in°uence than in conventional investor-owned¯rms. These¯rms typically require highly specialised labour and face thin markets for this labour. 3 Clearly with such small numbers competition is not possible.
2 This is related to arguments made by Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) who argue that owners have incentives to hire managers who have incentive contracts that reward according to a weighted average of pro¯ts and revenues. This makes managers more aggressive, which can raise pro¯ts in Cournot oligopoly.
3 For instance in the UK, there are only 9 paediatric rheumatologists.
We have found that the¯rm can improve its market position by strategically choosing its constitution. Suppose that the¯rm does not just choose its constitution once but is able to revise it at any future time. In this case, we obtain a result similar to the Coase conjecture. Consider a¯rm which is initially pro¯t maximising.
The¯rm will be tempted to change its constitution to increase sales and pro¯ts.
However the new control group will wish to further amend the constitution to appear more aggressive than it really is. Hence there could potentially be a whole series of expansions of the control group. The result of this process is that the¯rm will¯nish by losing all market power and producing the competitive level of output.
Dynamics of Non-Pro¯t Maximising Firms
It has been argued that co-operatives will tend to be unstable see for instance, Farrell (1985) . Consider a monopoly, which is selling below the pro¯t-maximising price, since shareholders are also consumers. Farrell argues that a raider (who is not a consumer)
could buy up shares at the current value and then make a pro¯t by increasing the product price to the pro¯t maximising level, thereby increasing the value of his/her
shares. This argument relies on a free-riding problem. Each existing shareholder will ignore the e®ect of his/her decision on the product price and hence will sell to a higher o®er by the raider. However we believe that this argument needs to be modi¯ed, since there is a similar free-riding problem with respect to the stockmarket value of the¯rm, see for instance Grossman and Hart (1980) . Once the latter e®ect is taken into account, we argue that reducing price below the pro¯t maximising level will not make a monopolist particularly vulnerable to take-over.
Organisation of the Paper Section 2 explains our model of¯rm decisions. Its use is illustrated by considering the price and quantity decisions of a uniform pricing monopolist in section 3. The e®ect of the¯rm's objective function on strategic interaction in markets is considered in section 4. The case where the¯rm is allowed to make multiple revisions to its constitution is modelled in section 5. The more general model where the¯rm interacts strategically with a number of rivals is considered in section 6. In section 7 we consider whether a non-pro¯t¯rm is vulnerable to takeover.
Section 8 summarises our conclusions. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
FIRMS
Economists usually assume that¯rms maximise pro¯ts. However the¯rm's objective function should be a derived concept. A¯rm is a collection of individuals, shareholders, managers, workers, customers etc. The¯rm's choices come about as a result of maximising behaviour by these individuals. The usual justi¯cation for assuming pro¯t maximisation is the Fisher Separation Theorem (see Milne (1974 ), Milne (1981 ), which says that if there are no externalities, the¯rm has no market power and¯nancial markets are complete, all shareholders will wish to maximise the value of the¯rm.
In the presence of market distortions, it is not typically the case that owners will wish¯rms to maximise pro¯ts. The Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply if there is imperfect competition, since in that case, a change in the¯rm's production plan will a®ect prices as well as shareholders' wealth. Firstly, di®erent shareholders will make di®erent trade-o®s between more pro¯ts and lower prices. Hence, there will be disagreement between di®erent shareholders about the policy of the¯rm.
Secondly, typically, no shareholder will wish to maximise pro¯ts. Indeed the concept of pro¯t maximisation is not well de¯ned. Since the¯rm's decisions can change relative prices, there is more than one price system which can be used to measure pro¯ts. Other market distortions such as incomplete markets 4 or externalities will create similar problems for the objective function of the¯rm. As argued above, in the presence of market distortions, shareholder unanimity cannot be guaranteed. Figure 1 indicates the problem for a monopolist. The diagram shows the production set for a monopolist who can produce two goods X 1 and X 2 :
Since the¯rm has monopoly power, the prices will depend on the¯rm's trade. The diagram shows two possible production vectors for the¯rm. These will give rise to two di®erent price systems. As can be seen from the diagram, individuals A and B have opposite preferences over the two production plans.
Despite this, it is still the case that there are decisions on which all members of the control group will agree. For instance, we show that a¯rm, which has a monopoly, will charge less than the pro¯t maximising price. Thus conventional pro¯t-maximising models may have overstated the size of the distortions due to monopoly.
It has been suggested that in addition to shareholders, other parties a®ected by ā rm's activities should be given in°uence in the¯rm's decisions. These would include inter alia representatives of workers, customers and the local community. This paper is able to throw some light on this proposal. Suppose a¯rm has monopoly power, which cannot be removed by other means. Our model implies that up to a point, increasing customer in°uence on decisions will reduce distortions. Moreover it could a®ect competition in the product market. Similarly increasing worker in°uence can be bene¯cial if a¯rm has monopsony power.
We model the¯rm as a collection of individuals, shareholders, managers, workers and possibly customers and other stakeholders. Our aim is to relate the¯rm's objective function to optimising behaviour by these individuals. The decisions of¯rm f are assumed to be made by a group of individuals C f ½ f1; :::; Hg, which we shall refer to as the control group of¯rm f: The¯rm's preferences are assumed to be a function of the preferences of the control group. We do not assume the¯rm's preferences are complete or transitive, thus avoiding social choice problems. Note that we do not exclude the possibility that individuals, who are not shareholders (e.g. managers), are able to in°uence the¯rm's preferences. We shall not model the internal decision making of the control group explicitly but simply assume that whatever procedure is used, respects unanimity. Hence, our results do not depend very sensitively on the composition of the control group.
Assumption 2.1 The¯rm's decision procedure respects unanimous preferences of the control group in the sense that if all members of the control group prefer policy a to policy b with at least one strict preference, then the¯rm will not choose policy b:
Assumption 2.2 Forf 6 =f ; Cf \ Cf = ;:
This says that there is no overlap between the control groups of di®erent¯rms.
We make this assumption to avoid issues of collusion, which are beyond the scope of the present paper.
There is a large literature on the theory of the¯rm, its objectives and implications for its organization. (2000) for a sample).
5 See Hart (1995) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Allen and Gale (2000) for a sample of recent surveys.
6 See Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) , Askildsen, Ireland, and Law (1988) , Ireland and Stewart (1995) for a sample.
MONOPOLY
In this section we study the implications of our model of the¯rm for monopolies. Recall that a pro¯t-maximising monopolist will price according to the inverse elasticity rule, which says that the mark-up of price over marginal cost is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand.
Price Decisions
Consider a¯rm which is the sole producer of good x. Let c (x) denote the cost of producing quantity x. Let D (p) denote the demand when the price of monopoly goods is p: The monopolist's pro¯ts are given by
Notation 3.1 We shall assume, without loss of generality, that the control group of the monopolist is fh : 1 6 h 6 Mg:
Assume that members of the control group have quasi-linear utility functions
Since the monopolist implements unanimous preferences of the control group, the optimal point can be obtained by maximising a weighted sum, P M h=1¸h u h ; of the utilities of control group members for some nonnegative weights¸h: We may normalise the¸'s by requiring
A non pro¯t maximising¯rm chooses p to maximise:
Di®erentiating with respect to p we obtain, D (p) +p dD dp ¡ dc dx dD dp + P M h=1¸h dv h dp = 0: By Roy's identity dv h dp = ¡x h ;
7 This normalisation is possible provided P M h=1¸h µ h 6 = 0: If this were not satis¯ed, the claimants of the¯rm's pro¯t stream would be given no in°uence over the¯rm's decisions. We shall not consider this case further, as we believe it to be of little economic interest.
hence, the¯rst order condition may be written as:
where´is the elasticity of demand. As can be seen, the price is given by a modi¯ed version of the inverse elasticity rule. If the¯rm has a single owner-manager, individual i, this can be further simpli¯ed to
If the owner consumes all of the¯rm's output then the price will be equal to marginal cost, while if (s)he consume none of the output this reduces to the usual pricing formula. In general, the optimal price is between marginal cost and the pro¯t maximising level. If the elasticity of demand is constant, then price is lower the greater the owner's consumption of the monopoly good.
If the control group has multiple members, price is not necessarily equal to marginal cost, even if they consume all of the¯rm's output. The price will also depend on the relative bargaining power of di®erent members of the control group.
Those with relatively large shareholdings and lower consumption will want higher prices. Other things equal, the price will be lower, the greater the weight given to members of the control group with higher consumption. 8
8 The problem of a monopolist with some consumers in the control group has been previously considered by Farrell (1985) , who assumed unanimity as the¯rm's decision rule or Hart and Moore (1996) and Renstrom and Yalcin (1997) , who used the median voter rule. Our results are more general since we do not restrict attention to a speci¯c decision procedure. However, due to the generality of the model, we do not obtain conditions for Pareto optimality, unlike the earlier papers.
Stakeholder Representation
In policy debates on corporate governance, it has been argued that¯rms should not just be run in the interests of shareholders. It is desirable to give other stakeholders representation in¯rms' decisions. Our model can be used to examine this proposal.
We interpret a stakeholder to be an individual who owns no shares but is a worker or consumer. Consider the case where there are two individuals in the control group.
Individual 1 is the sole owner. Individual 2 is a \stakeholder" who has no ownership share but may nevertheless have in°uence on decisions.
Our normalisation of the¸'s implies that¸1 = 1; 0 6¸2 < 1: Under these assumptions, (1) becomes,
Increasing the in°uence of stakeholders would correspond to increasing¸2. By equation (3) this will lower the price of the monopoly good. Hence if competition is impossible, a¯rm with some stakeholder representation would be preferable to a pro¯t-maximising monopolist. However, if the power of stakeholders is made too great, price could be reduced below marginal cost, which would be ine±cient. In this case stakeholders would be using their in°uence to make ine±cient transfers from the owners to themselves. 
Monopsony
Our theory so far has emphasised imperfect competition in the product market and the involvement of consumers in¯rms' decisions. However similar reasoning applies if some input markets are imperfectly competitive . This would provide a justi¯cation for giving input suppliers a special role in decisions. The most common examples are where the¯rm is owned by suppliers of a particular form of labour.
It is not uncommon for¯rms to face imperfect competition in the labour market.
The market for labour is often thin. It has been argued that the labour market is in many cases a market for teams of workers not individual workers. This strengthens our point, since the market for teams of workers is less likely to be competitive. These results are not speci¯c to the labour market. They would also apply if other input markets are imperfectly competitive. Another example is farm marketing cooperatives, which buy the output of farms on imperfectly competitive markets.
Consider a¯rm which produces a single output for a competitive market, and has a subset of inputs that are bought on competitive markets and the remainder are bought on imperfectly competitive markets. Assume that the¯rm faces an input supply function S (w). Pro¯ts are given by ¼ = p:g (S (w)) ¡ wS (w) ; where p is the price of output, w is the input price vector and g is the production function.
We can apply similar reasoning to that used in the monopoly case. Hence we can reinterpret the monopoly¯rst order conditions replacing monopoly with monopsony and demand elasticity with supply elasticity. In the special case where there is only one monopsony input, which is owned by the sole owner of the¯rm, then the input quantity will be e±cient. Conversely, if the suppliers of the input are excluded from the decision process then, as usual, we will obtain an ine±cient low input price. In the more general case, where there is more than one owner, the price of the input will be between the competitive level and the monopsony level, depending upon the in°uence of suppliers in the control group. In other words, the monopsony distortion is moderated by the in°uence of suppliers, and in turn the ine±ciency is moderated by including the supplier of the monopsony input.
When there is more than one monopsony input, the situation is only a little more complicated. Now the quantity of each monopsony input will be determined by the generalised monopsony pricing rule. Notice that other things equal, the more elastic the supply then the closer the pricing rule approximates the competitive rule and the less importance there is in including the supplier in the control group. In the limit where the supply is perfectly elastic, the supplier plays no e®ective role in the control decision. Conversely, the more inelastic the supply, the more important the supplier is in a®ecting the production and input pricing rule.
COURNOT OLIGOPOLY
We now consider oligopolistic markets. Most of our analysis of monopoly can be extended to this case. If those in charge of the¯rm are, in part, consumers the price will be below the pro¯t maximising level. The results concerning stakeholder representation can also be extended to oligopoly. In addition the constitution of the¯rm a®ects strategic interaction in markets. Giving greater representation to individuals who are relatively high consumers of the product is a means to committing to a high output. This is an advantage in Cournot oligopoly. In e®ect it converts a Cournot oligopolist into a Stackleberg leader. Hence if there are distortions in the labour and/or product markets, other forms of corporate governance may be superior to conventional pro¯t-maximising¯rms.
We can endogenise the constitution of the¯rm by assuming that it is designed by an entrepreneur to maximise the value of the¯rm. Only in exceptional circumstances would (s)he would choose pro¯t maximisation. Alternatively assume the constitution of the¯rm is designed by a social planner. This gives a second way to endogenise the objective function of the¯rm. This analysis could have policy implications for the design of corporate law.
Model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n¯rms, which can produce at constant marginal and average cost c: For simplicity we assume a linear inverse demand curve p = 1 ¡ P n i=1 x i ; where x i denotes the output of¯rm i:
We assume that there are two types of individuals, type A and type B. Type A individuals do not consume the industry's output and u A = µ A ¼ A : 9 Type B individuals care both about income and consumption of the output. Consequently they
We consider the case where the¯rm has a control group which consists of two members. One of type A and one of type B: The type A individual is assumed to own all of the equity. Thus the utility of the type A (resp. B) individual may be
The same individual is not represented in the control group of more than one¯rm. Our normalisation of the¸'s implies¸A = 1; 0 6¸B 6 1:
As in the previous section, the decisions of the¯rm may be represented as maximising u A +¸B i u B ; after normalisation. We write¸i for¸B i . We consider the following 2-stage game. In the¯rst period, the owners choose¸i to maximise the value of thē rm. In the second stage the¯rms compete in quantities Cournot-style. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the 2-stage game.
Proposition 4.1 In an n¡¯rm oligopoly the reaction function of¯rm i is given by
Proof. Firm i maximises:
The¯rst order condition for optimal choice of x i is:
The higher¸i the greater the in°uence given to individual B. The proposition implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in¸i will increase x i : This makes¯rm i more aggressive, which is advantageous in a game of strategic substitutes. Firms with a larger value of¸i will produce higher output in equilibrium. A possible example of this can be found Refsell (1914) , who shows that cooperative grain elevators expanded their output signi¯cantly at the expense of their for-pro¯t rivals in the period 1903-
1913.
Proposition 4.2 Let`n denote the value of¸i in a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium with n¯rms. Then`n is given bỳ
This shows that the optimal value of¸tends to 0 as n tends to in¯nity. The more competitive the market is, the closer¯rms should stick to pro¯t maximisation.
Given that n is restricted to take integer values, the maximum value of`n occurs at n = 2 or 3: Thereafter`n is strictly decreasing in n: The analysis requires n > 2 to be economically meaningful. This is intuitive, as n increases the market distortion decreases, thus there is less scope for strategic behaviour. Hence the strategic e®ect of the¯rm's governance is likely to be greatest when the number of¯rms is small and declines as the market becomes more competitive.
These results generalise. Whenever Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes, pro¯t can be raised by giving some in°uence to consumers. Our results do not depend crucially on assumptions about the preferences of the di®erent individuals.
Similar results could be proved if a¯rm were owned by a number of individuals who have di®erent preferences between consumption and pro¯ts. By adjusting the decision weights of these individuals, the¯rm can commit to a more or less aggressive policy in the product market. This is demonstrated by the results in section 6, in which a more general form of preferences is used.
The model in some respects resembles a prisoner's dilemma. Each¯rm on its own will raise pro¯t by increasing¸i. However if all¯rms do this simultaneously they will receive lower pro¯ts than in the original situation. However the total gain in consumer surplus will exceed the loss in pro¯ts. Hence there would still be an incentive for consumers to make these changes.
11
11 Dierker and Grodal (1996) have a result which is almost the reverse of this. They show that under Bertrand competition owners have higher utility if they delegate the running of the¯rm to a manger with an incentive to maximise pro¯ts than if they directly run the¯rm themselves.
Optimal Constitution of the Firm
In this section we consider two ways to endogenise the constitution of the¯rm.
Speci¯cally we consider a constitution which is optimal from the point of view of a social planner or an entrepreneur who wishes to maximise the value of the¯rm. The model is similar to that in the previous section.
Social Planner
Suppose that the constitution of the¯rm is chosen by the social planner to maximise the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We assume that for each¯rm f the¸f is chosen by the social planner. Let¸¤ n denote the social planner's optimal value of¸f in an n¡¯rm industry. The social planner is not however able to intervene directly in the markets to make them more competitive or to set prices. 
As usual, the social planner will choose to produce where price equals marginal cost,
; from which the result follows:
Assume all consumers are represented in the¯rm, then x 2 1 = 1¡c n . Substituting into equation (5) we¯nd¸¤ n = 1: This implies that shareholders and stakeholders should be given equal in°uence over the¯rm's decisions. Recall we found a similar re-sult for a monopoly. From the social planner's point of view, the optimal constitution does not depend on the number of¯rms in the industry.
Entrepreneur
Now suppose that an entrepreneur designs the constitution of the¯rm to maximise the value at which he can sell it. If the organisation is sold as a pro¯t maximisinḡ rm the price achieved will only be the Cournot oligopoly pro¯ts. Higher pro¯ts can be made by selling the¯rm if it has the optimal degree of consumer representation.
In this case the entrepreneur will receive the pro¯ts of a Stackleberg leader.
Equally if the problem is not one of designing a constitution from scratch, then in a Cournot duopoly, a¯rm can increase its pro¯ts to the Stackleberg level by giving representation to consumers. The market for corporate control may have a similar e®ect. If the¯rm did not initially have the optimal form of corporate governance then an outsider could pro¯tably buy up the shares and reorganise the¯rm. Subsequently the¯rm could be re-sold at a pro¯t.
Input Markets
Now consider the case where the¯rm faces competition from a small number of other purchasers on input markets. We shall obtain results which are broadly similar to our analysis of oligopoly. If¯rms compete in quantities Cournot-style in the labour market, then the¯rm's strategic position may be improved by giving workers or their representatives in°uence in decision-making. We believe that imperfect competition may be more important in input markets than in output markets. This is because labour markets are often highly specialised both by skill and by location. Note that it is more common to give in°uence in¯rms' decisions to suppliers of inputs than to customers. In these circumstances, it may be in the interest of the¯rm's owners to give shares to workers or other individuals with an interest in increasing labour demand. (Assuming that these individuals could be prevented from re-selling the shares.) 12
EQUILIBRIUM CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM
As argued in previous sections, if the founder of a¯rm wishes to maximise pro¯t it is in his/her interest to choose the constitution of the¯rm strategically. This is equally true when the other¯rms do not maximise pro¯t. Whenever the rival¯rms have a downward sloping reaction function, pro¯t can be increased by adopting a constitution, which commits the¯rm to behaving more aggressively. Likewise, the result does not depend crucially on the original objective of the¯rm. For instance, suppose a consumer cooperative aims to maximise a weighted average of consumer surplus and pro¯ts. Such a¯rm could better achieve its objective by committing to a more aggressive strategy. This would up to a point raise pro¯ts and increase consumer surplus because of the strategic e®ect on other¯rms' output. Thus increasing the cooperative's objective, provided it gives some weight to pro¯ts. More generally as long as the current control group gives positive weight to pro¯ts, it is in their interest to adopt a constitution which commits the¯rm to behaving more aggressively than they would choose themselves.
This suggests an alternative way to endogenise the constitution of the¯rm. We can de¯ne the equilibrium constitution of the¯rm to be such that there is no strategic reason to change the constitution according to the objective of the¯rm as de¯ned in the constitution itself. Essentially the equilibrium constitution is a¯xed point of the process of strategic delegation. This is intended as a theory of the objective function of the¯rm in an long run equilibrium, in which all possible adjustments have been made.
We obtain a result similar to the Coase conjecture. Consider a¯rm which is initially pro¯t maximising. The¯rm will be tempted to change its constitution to increase sales and pro¯ts. However if the¯rm cannot commit to prevent further changes to the constitution, there could be a series of changes each of which increases the¯rm's current objective when it was implemented. The result of this process is that the¯rm will¯nish by producing the competitive level of output. Unlike the Coase analysis, it is not essential for our argument that the¯rm's output be durable.
The model needs to be supplemented by imposing the requirement that the¯rm does not make losses. For the usual reasons, losses are not sustainable in long-run equilibrium.
If instead of giving in°uence away the original owner sold in°uence then the process may even be in the interest of the original owner. Individual B is always prepared to pay an amount equal to his/her increase in consumer surplus. Up to the Stackleberg point, the owner gets an indirect bene¯t from selling in°uence via the strategic e®ect on pro¯ts.
Model
There are 2¯rms. Firm 1 and¯rm 2, which compete Cournot style. For simplicity, we assume a linear inverse demand curve p = 1 ¡ x 1 ¡ x 2 : Firm 2 is a conventional pro¯t-maximising¯rm. Firm 1 has two members in the control group, one type A individual and one type of B. Recall type A (resp. B) individuals have utilities
We impose a zero pro¯t condition. There are two reasons for this. Firstly as price falls below marginal cost, all other¯rms, which are assumed to be maximising pro¯t, would exit from the industry. Thus issues of strategic delegation would no longer be relevant. Secondly since the model is intended as one of long run equilibrium, we assert that the¯rm would not be viable in the long run if it makes losses. The zero pro¯t condition can also be justi¯ed by limited liability considerations. Owners cannot be forced to contribute additional funds to the enterprise.
Assumption 5.1 Firms cannot make losses.
This implies that, price must be greater than or equal to marginal cost, p > c:
The following result demonstrates that in an equilibrium in which the¯rm does not wish to change its constitution, price will equal marginal cost. This implies that, in the absence of commitment, the¯rm will increasingly delegate more power to consumers' representatives.
Discussion
We have argued that by a process of successive strategic delegation, a¯rm can become taken-over by its customers. At¯rst sight this may appear implausible. However we believe this story does capture some aspects of reality. Firstly it should be noted that a customer may be another¯rm. There are documented cases in which upstream¯rms have been taken over by downstream¯rms, including the much discussed takeover of Fisher Body by General Motors. Another example is the purchase by farmers of¯rms which supply inputs (e.g. fertilizer) to farms, see Hansmann (1996) and Refsell (1914) . This result implies that¯rms will have incentives to adopt devices, which preclude too much strategic delegation to prevent loss of control. The¯rm has an interest to commit to no further strategic delegation after the¯rst stage. If such commitment is not possible then a far-sighted owner may not permit the¯rst round of strategic delegation foreseeing that it will trigger a whole series of successive delegations, which will ultimately have the e®ect of reducing his/her pro¯t.
An analogous story could be told in terms of input markets. The conclusion would be that successive rounds of delegation would hand control to input suppliers. who would bid more aggressively in the input market. The long run equilibrium of this process would occur where the¯rm's pro¯ts have been reduced to zero. In this case
we would see the suppliers of inputs would eventually take over the¯rm. If the input is top-level management, there is evidence that such a takeover has indeed happened, see Roe (1994) .
A related result can be found in Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996) . They show that rms in Cournot oligopoly have an incentive to divide themselves into competing divisions. The bene¯t of divisionalisation is that it has a strategic e®ect on the output of rivals. As the cost of creating new divisions tends to zero, price converges to marginal cost. Again lack of commitment can lead to excessive divisionalisation and a complete loss of market power.
MULTIPLE STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS
In previous sections we have found that the optimal constitution of the¯rm can be obtained by having a control group of two individuals and strategically adjusting their decision weights. This is obviously a very simpli¯ed model of a¯rm. The reason a very simple constitution can be optimal is that the¯rm was only engaged in one strategic interaction. In reality a¯rm is likely to be engaged in a number of strategic interactions. It can be selling products in a number of markets which are oligopolistic. In addition input markets may also be imperfectly competitive.
The¯rm may be involved in other kinds of strategic interaction such as competitive advertising or patent races.
In this section we provide a more general model. In particular we show that these conclusions are not speci¯c to Cournot oligopoly. We consider a¯rm which is engaged in m strategic interactions. In this case a more complex constitution for thē rm is justi¯ed. The optimal constitution can be achieved by having m + 1 members of the control group and strategically choosing their decision weights.
In this section we abstract from particular forms of inputs and outputs and game forms and consider a more general strategic situation. In this model, a number of agents control a¯rm, choosing strategic variables so as to maximize the weighted sum of their utilities that are derived indirectly from pro¯ts and directly from the strategic variables. This objective allows us to admit any form of bargaining model where the agents have an e±cient sharing of welfare from the jointly decided strategic variables.
In addition we allow other¯rms to interact with the¯rm under consideration.
The idea of the general model is to provide an integrated structure, which allows general results. More detailed models can be¯tted into the general framework. This allows illustrations of the general results and additional results that depend upon the speci¯c restrictions of the illustrative models.
Model
The model consists of m + 1¯rms. Firm 0 interacts strategically with m other¯rms.
The pro¯ts of¯rm 0 are given by,
The pro¯ts of¯rm j are given by Ã j (x j ; y j ) ; for 1 6 j 6 m: Here x 1 ; :::; x m are strategic variables controlled by¯rm 0 and y j is a strategic variable controlled bȳ rm j for 1 6 j 6 m:
Suppose that the control group of¯rm 0 consists of m +1 individuals, 0 6 i 6 m:
Individual 0 is only concerned about the pro¯ts he receives from¯rm 0. He/she has utility function u for some weights¸i:
We consider the following 2-stage game. First¯rm 0 chooses the¸i's. In the second stage,¯rm 0 chooses x 1 ; :::; x m and¯rm j chooses y j ; for 1 6 j 6 m: In the second stage¯rms make their choices simultaneously and independently.
Proposition 6.1 The optimal value of¸j is given by
Proof. Let R j denote the reaction function of¯rm j; de¯ned by
The slope of the reaction curve is given by, Ã j 21
If¯rm 0 can act as a Stackleberg leader in all of its strategic interactions, its pro¯t will be given by,
The¯rst order condition for maximising this is:
Firm 0's¯rst order condition for x j is, P m 
Comparing (7) and (8) we see that if
the¯rm can obtain pro¯ts as if it were a Stackleberg leader in all of the strategic interactions. Since this sets an upper bound to the pro¯ts¯rm 0 can make in the second stage, the result follows.
Incentive compatibility implies that it will be not be possible to implement a negative value of¸j: If either there are negative (resp. positive) externalities and strategic substitutes (resp. complements) then equation (6) implies that the optimaļ j will be positive. Otherwise the best value of¸j would be zero.
To be speci¯c assume that¯rm j's strategic variable has a negative e®ect on¯rm 0, Á This discussion clari¯es the factors which determine the¸'s, as well as demonstrating that a multi-member control group may be optimal.
STABILITY OF NON-PROFIT FIRMS
In this section we argue that a¯rm, where shareholders are also consumers, is not vulnerable to takeover by an outsider. Consider a cooperative of M individuals, 1 6 i 6 M: 13 In the initial situation, assume that individual i gets bene¯ts
from shares in the¯rm. Here ¼ 0 denotes the current value of the¯rm's pro¯ts and d i denotes the value of being able to purchase the good below the monopoly price.
These bene¯ts are experienced, whether or not the individual owns shares in the¯rm.
Assume that the cooperative's decisions are made by majority rule, so a change will be introduced if at least half the members approve.
In a cooperative, decisions can be distorted due to the di®erence in preferences between the median voter and the mean voter. To exclude this e®ect, we shall make the following assumption. If it is seriously violated, there is little case for having this 13 We assume that M is odd, so that there is a well-de¯ned median voter.
good supplied by a cooperative, since only a minority of members would get a bene¯t from it.
Assumption 7.1 The median value of d i is greater than or equal to the mean value.
i.e.¯i :
We consider the following model of a takeover attempt. First a raider decides whether or not to o®er to purchase the shares from members at price p: Then the existing shareholders decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to accept the o®er. If the raider is successful, (s)he will increase pro¯ts to ¼ 1 by raising price or eliminating positive externalities. We assume that
If this assumption were not satis¯ed the raider's policies would be approved by a majority vote of the existing members and there would be no need for a takeover.
The following result implies that the cooperative is not in fact vulnerable to a takeover.
Proposition 7.1 There does not exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in which the raider succeeds in taking over the¯rm.
The raider is not able to take-over the¯rm for the reasons identi¯ed in Grossman and Hart (1980) The existing shareholders free-ride on the price of shares. By not accepting the o®er, shareholders get the bene¯t from the increase in share price without contributing to the costs. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that¯rms have incentives to overcome the free-rider problem by adopting constitutions, which allow raiders to either compulsorily purchase minority shares or dilute the rights of minority shareholders. Alternatively it may be desirable for government to introduce legislation allowing compulsory purchase of minority shares (as in the UK). In the present context, the raider's behaviour is undesirable to existing shareholders and possibly society in general. It is in the interest of the cooperative to introduce a constitution, which gives strong protection to minority rights. This will make free-riding easier and consequently reduce the chances of a hostile takeover. Hansmann (1996) shows that most consumer cooperatives allocate voting rights in proportion to the fraction of the output purchased. This would be one way to protect against takeovers. This may explain why most governments o®er separate laws dealing with cooperatives and business¯rms. Protection against takeover may be more desirable for cooperatives.
If the industry is an oligopoly then the strategic considerations, discussed in section 4, could also make a take-over of a cooperative unpro¯table.
CONCLUSION 8.1 Summary
In this paper we have argued that an important determinant of corporate governance is the degree of competition in product and input markets. This is supported by the evidence in Hansmann (1996) . Consider the alternative hypothesis that choice of rm organisation depends upon political attitudes. In particular those with more leftwing attitudes prefer non-standard¯rms. The evidence does not seem to support this view. Manufacturing is generally carried out by conventional for-pro¯t¯rms, while accountants, lawyers and farmers tend to use cooperative or partnerships. However one would not expect any of the latter groups to have particularly left-wing political views.
We believe an advantage of our model is that it provides an endogenous theory of corporate governance. This can be done in three ways, the¯rm's constitution could be chosen by an entrepreneur to maximise the value at which the¯rm can be sold; the¯rm's constitution could be chosen by those currently controlling the¯rm to maximise their objectives or the system of corporate governance could be chosen by a social planner to maximise social welfare. Although a number of suggestions have been made, at present economics lacks a well established theory of corporate governance. All three proposals have validity beyond the present context. None of them would imply that a¯rm would aim to directly maximise pro¯t in the presence of market imperfections.
It has been argued that¯rms produce pro¯ts at the expense of such factors as the well being of the community or the environment Defenders of capitalism have argued that, pro¯t maximisation is compatible with broader objectives. A¯rm which neglects the local community or the environment will not make the highest pro¯t in the long-run, since relations with suppliers, workers, customers, etc. will be damaged. We take this argument one stage further. Where there is market power, pro¯t maximisation is not in the interest of the¯rm, even in the short run. This arises because¯rms' decisions are made by individuals who are also members of the community. In part, they bear the consequences of their own decisions. As argued in Hansmann (1996) , economic institutions emerge endogenously to cope with market power, externalities or asymmetric information.
Our study of monopoly, suggest that increasing economic democracy is likely to be socially desirable. However in some cases we may get the opposite result. For instance, suppose that all the¯rms in a Cournot oligopoly have the same shareholders who are not consumers. Then they will unanimously agree that each¯rm in the industry should produce its share of the collusive output. Hence the¯nal price to the consumer will be the monopoly price. This will be detrimental to social welfare for the usual reasons.
Another case where pro¯t-maximising behaviour may be socially desirable, is durable goods monopoly. Coase (1972) argued that if initially, a monopolist sold a durable good at the monopoly price, then subsequently it would be pro¯table to sell additional units at a lower price. If consumers anticipated this, demand will be reduced in the¯rst period, hence the¯rm will not be able to achieve the full monopoly price. Under some assumptions, it can be shown that if the good is in¯nitely durable and consumers have perfect foresight then, the monopolist will price at marginal cost.
It seems unlikely that this argument can be extended to non-pro¯t maximisinḡ rms. If the¯rm cuts price in the second period, the cost is born by those who purchased in the¯rst period. If these consumers are represented in the¯rm's control group, they will have less incentive to cut price in future periods than a pro¯t maximising¯rm. Consequently a non-pro¯t maximising¯rm would set a higher price for a durable good. This will result in price being above marginal cost, which is socially undesirable for the usual reasons.
More generally we believe that there needs to be a rethinking of many results from industrial organisation to allow for more detailed modelling of the internal organisation of the¯rm.
As an example consider management buy-outs (MBO's). Much of the existing literature on management buy-outs has used an agency theoretic approach. It is argued that their main bene¯t is improved incentives for management. In the present paper we argue that the changes in corporate governance can a®ect a¯rm's position in the product and/or labour markets. The main e®ect of an MBO is to transfer control of the¯rm from investors to a suppliers of managerial labour. If the managerial labour market is imperfectly competitive this could have the e®ect of improving the¯rm's strategic position in that market. Thus an MBO may advantageously a®ect the¯rm's position in markets as well as having bene¯cial e®ects on incentives.
A possible direction for the future is that skilled labour will become more important. This would shift the bargaining power within organisations. In the¯rm of the future it is possible that capital will be hired by a coalition of skilled workers. The model in the present paper may help us to understand such changes.
Ine±cient Mechanisms and Hold-ups
One possible criticism of our model is that we restrict attention to e±cient decisionprocedures within the¯rm, while, ine±ciency appears to be common. In practice,
there are many kinds of friction, which may arise in intra-¯rm bargaining. Despite this we believe similar analysis to the present paper will apply to most plausible mechanisms which are not fully e±cient. It is virtually impossible to prove general results for all ine±cient mechanisms, since there are too many possible sources of ine±ciency. We shall illustrate our arguments by considering a speci¯c example, the hold-up problem.
We may modify our model to allow for the possibility of a hold-up as follows.
There are two time periods, t = 0; 1: At time t = 0 each member i of the control group can make a relationship-speci¯c investment, e i for 1 6 i 6 M. The investment is only of use in the current¯rm and reduces the cost of production. It is observable but not veri¯able. At t = 1 the model is like that in the present paper. The¯rm is assumed to use a decision procedure at t = 1; which is ex-post e±cient. In general the members of the control group will not choose the e±cient level of investment at t = 0 because they will not receive the full marginal bene¯t of their investments.
The extent of under-investment depends upon the particular decision rule used. In this case, the results of the present paper will apply for a given level of ex-ante investments.
In the special case, where the ex-ante investments only a®ect¯xed costs, our previous results still apply despite the ex-ante ine±ciency. A uniform pricing monopolist will charge less than the pro¯t-maximising price. Now assume now that thē rm-speci¯c investments reduce marginal cost. Then the under-investment tends to increase marginal cost relative to the¯rst-best, while the managerial¯rm will have a smaller mark-up over marginal cost than a pro¯t-maximising¯rm. These two e®ects are working against one another and in general it will not be possible to provide an unambiguous comparison.
Related Literature
Levin and Tadelis (2002) shows that partnerships can be superior to standard¯rms in the provision of services. The point is the quality is not observable. As is well known, a partnership will hire less workers than the corresponding for-pro¯t¯rm. Where worker ability varies, this results in the partnership hiring higher quality workers and hence producing a better service. Assuming customers cannot observe the quality directly, they will prefer to purchase from partnerships, which can therefore be more pro¯table. This has a similar structure to the model in the present paper. In both cases the choice of corporate governance a®ects the beliefs of other agents. This causes them to change their behaviour, which indirectly a®ects the pro¯ts of thē rm. Taking into account these indirect e®ects a conventional¯rm may not be the most pro¯table. Evidence also supports this viewpoint. As Hansmann (1996) shows the main reasons for¯rms to adopt non-pro¯t forms are imperfect competition and asymmetric information Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) and Vickers (1985) have previously shown that a pro¯t maximising owner of a¯rm may have strategic reasons for giving incentives to managers not to maximise pro¯t. In particular in Cournot oligopoly, a manager whose pay depends on a convex combination of pro¯t and revenue will make more pro¯t than a manager whose pay depends on pro¯t alone.
APPENDIX

A Oligopoly
This appendix contains proofs of our results on oligopoly.
Proposition 4.2
In a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium with n¯rms,`n is given by`n
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Consider a given¯rm,¯rm i: In a symmetric equilibrium x j = x k for j; k 6 = i: Hence using equation (4),
:
The reaction function of¯rms other than i is given by
where x ¡i = P j6 =i x j denotes the total output of all¯rms other than i:
In the Stackleberg equilibrium when¯rm i is the leader and takes the reaction function de¯ned by (10) as given, the value of x i is given by
From equation (4), the equilibrium value of x i is,
The level of¸i; which maximises pro¯t, is achieved where the equilibrium output is equal to the Stackleberg output,
, which implieş
This gives the pro¯t maximising choice of¸i; given that all other¯rms choose¸j =`n; for j 6 = i:
In symmetric equilibrium,¸i =`n; hence`n
; from which the result follows Lemma A.1 In a Cournot duopoly where¯rm 2 is a pro¯t maximising¯rm, the market equilibrium is given by,
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, the reaction function of¯rm 1 (resp. 2) is given by
). Solving in the usual way we obtain,
and ¹
: The equilibrium price is given by,
The only equilibrium constitution is where¸B =¸¤ B = 1¡c x B ;
x 1 = 1 ¡ c and p = c:
Proof of Proposition 5.1 To check¸B =¸¤ B is indeed an equilibrium. If¸B = 1 B then from (12) the equilibrium quantity and price will be x 1 = 1 ¡ c and
As before we may represent the¯rm's objective as:
: From the point of view of the equilibrium constitution, the e®ect of a change in¸B on the¯rm's objective is given by
Note that the initial value of¸B, 1 B is treated as constant for this di®erentiation. The second order condition is satis¯ed: Evaluating at¸B =¸¤ B ;
1: This establishes that the¯rm would not want to decrease¸B:
The¯rm has no incentive to increase¸B; since it is already supplying the entire market. Firm 2's output is zero, hence there is no strategic e®ect of further reductions in¸B: The only e®ect of reducing¸B further would be to cause the¯rm to increase its output beyond the current level. This is not desirable as the current level is already optimal according to the current objective function.
Uniqueness.
If we assume x B 6 3 4 then it is clear that 
B Stability
This appendix shows that a non-pro¯t¯rm is not vulnerable to takeover by a pro¯t maximising outsider.
If p > ¼ 1 ; the raider can never make a positive pro¯t, hence we may assume Proof of Proposition 7.1 By Lemma B.1, if the raider made an o®er she would not get enough acceptances in the second round to gain control of the¯rm. Hence the raider would make a loss of (m ¡ 1) (¼ 0 ¡ p) : It follows that making a take-over bid is not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium.
C FULL PROOFS
This appendix gives more detailed proofs of selected results. It is included to help with checking the results. It is not intended for publication.
Proposition 4.2
In a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium with n¯rms,`n is given by`n = (n ¡ 1) (1 ¡ c) (n 2 + 1) x B :
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Consider a given¯rm,¯rm i: In a symmetric equilibrium x j = x k for j; k 6 = i: Hence using equation (4), x j = 1¡c¡(n¡2)x j ¡x i +¸jx B 2
We shall now proceed to¯nd the Stackleberg equilibrium when¯rm i is the leader. Firm i's pro¯ts are given by
n ¡ n¡1 n`n x B ¢ x i : The¯rst order condition for pro¯t maximisation is, The level of¸i which maximises pro¯t is achieved where the equilibrium output is equal to the Stackleberg output,x i = x s i : Thus 
In symmetric equilibrium,¸i =`n; hence`n ³ 1 + 
:
The equilibrium price is given by, p = 1 ¡ The¯rm has no incentive to increase¸B; since it is already supplying the entire market. Firm 2's output is zero, hence there is no strategic e®ect of further reductions in¸B: The only e®ect of reducing¸B further would be to cause the¯rm to increase its output beyond the current output. This is not desirable as the current level is already optimal according to the current objective function. 
Uniqueness
